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REINVIGORATING TITLE VI: DEFENDING
HEALTH CARE DISCRIMINATION-IT
SHOULDN'T BE SO EASY
SIDNEYD. WATSON*
INTRODUCTION

... Mrs. Carolyn Payne, a 21-year-old black resident of Holly Springs,
Mississippi, delivered her own baby in the front seat of a truck after
the emergency room of the Marshall County Hospital had refused
admission.'
Ysidro Aguinagas, an 11-month-old Hispanic baby, died... after
being denied admission to a public hospital in Dimmitt, Texas, despite
the fact that the hospital was ... publicly financed. The baby would
not be admitted without a $450 deposit.2
...

an Hispanic man, conscious and speaking Spanish, arrived at an
emergency room at 7 p.m. for treatment of stab wounds suffered in an
attack. No doctor arrived until 8:30. Upon arrival, the doctor inquired about insurance for the patient and whether the patient was in
the country legally. The wife, also Spanish speaking and monolingual,
could not satisfactorily answer these questions. By 10 p.m. that evening, three hours after his arrival, the patient died. He had been inadequately treated. He was a U.S. citizen. 3
...

ALMOST daily, newspapers and television news reports carry stories
IX
ke these about people who are turned away from the medical care
they need. The problem is usually identified as money-fifteen percent of
this nation's population, almost thirty-seven million people, have no
form of health insurance4 and little or no money to pay for care.' Yet
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colleagues Theodore Y. Blumore, Mark L. Jones, Ivan Rutledge and Laura Gardner
Webster, and to Harold S. Lewis, Jr. of Fordham Law School for their thoughtful comments on a draft manuscript. I also thank Dean Phil Shelton of Mercer Law School for
financial support and research assistant Jerry Ray Poole, Jr. I especially want to acknowledge the prompt and untiring research, comnments and help of research assistant
Claire Chapman.
1. Institute of Medicine, Health Care in a Context of Civil Rights 22 (1981) [hereinafter Health Care in Context] (quoting Letter from Sylvia Drew Ivie, Ben Thomas Cole
and Beth Lief to Harry P. Cain, Bureau of Health Planning and Resource Development,
Department of Health Education and Welfare ("HEW") to David Tatel, Director, Office
for Civil Rights, HEW (November 7, 1977)).
2. Id. (quoting Sylvia Drew Ivie, Ending Discrimination in Health Care: A Dream
Deferred, Presentation Before the U.S. Civil Rights Commission (April 15, 1980)).
3. Id.
4. As one study found:
Virtually all elderly Americans have financial access to acute health care
through Medicare. Of the 210.6 million nonelderly in the United States, how-
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money is not the underlying issue in our three horror stories; these patients were able to pay for care, if given some time. On the other hand,
each of the patients was a person of color, and each was denied medical
care: here lies the underlying problem. Race discrimination is an almost
silent yet pervasive problem in American health care.
Prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,6 health care facilities
openly discriminated against Blacks.7 Most hospitals excluded Black patients and Black physicians altogether. The hospitals that did admit
Blacks segregated them in separate wards with Black physicians and support staff' Federal money supported this segregation through awards of
federal Hill Burton Act hospital construction money to segregated
hospitals. 9
ever, nearly two-thirds receive health insurance through employer-sponsored
plans, either as workers or dependents, and about one-sixth have health insurance through a mix of Medicaid, Medicare, CHAMPUS (the health program
for military employees, retirees, and their dependents), individually purchased
private policies, and other health insurance sources. However, this patchwork
arrangement leaves about one-sixth of the nonelderly, or 37 million people, with
no health insurance at all.
Shipp, Health Insurance and the Uninsured, 9 Cong. Res. Serv. Rev. 9, 25 (1988).
5. Although the United States has the most technologically advanced health care
system in the world, it is the only industrialized nation, other than South Africa, that
does not provide universal access to health care.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000a-6, 2000b-2000b-3, 2000c-2000c-9,
2000d-2000d-4, 2000e-2000e-17, 2000f 2000g-2000g-3, 2000h-2000h-6 (1982).
7. The author believes that Black denotes a specific cultural group rather than
merely a skin color and therefore will capitalize the word throughout this Article. See,
eg., Crenshaw, Race Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) ("I shall use an uppercase 'B' to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun."); see also
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,Method, and the State: An Agendafor Theory, 7 Signs:
J. Women in Culture & Soc'y 515, 516 (1982) (noting that "Black" should not be regarded "as merely a color of skin pigmentation, but as a heritage, an experience, a cultural and personal identity, the meaning of which becomes specifically stigmatic and/or
glorious and/or ordinary under specific social conditions").
8. See H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 25-26, pt. II, at 24, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2391, 2511.
9. Segregated facilities were eligible to receive federal funding as long as they certified that there was a "separate but equal" facility available to treat Blacks. In 1963, the
Fourth Circuit struck down this "separate but equal" funding policy as a violation of
equal protection. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 969 (4th
Cir. 1963) (en banc), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). In Simkins a group of Black
doctors, dentists and patients filed suit against two North Carolina hospitals. See id. at
962-63. Both hospitals had received sizable federal construction grants even though they
maintained a policy of excluding Black patients and doctors. See id. HEW, the grantor
agency, granted the construction monies because the hospitals had guaranteed that there
were "separate hospitals for separate population groups." Id. at 965. The court held that
the refusal to grant staff privileges to Black doctors and to admit Black patients discriminated against them in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, finding that the hospitals' receipt of federal construction money constituted state
action. See id. at 967-68. Moreover, the court stated that federal agencies could not
authorize grantees to take unconstitutional action but were constrained to ensure that
grantees operated constitutionally. See id. at 968.
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Congress passed Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,"0 in part, to
ensure that federal money could no longer be used to support segregated
health care facilities. I I Title VI prohibits programs and activities that
receive federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of

race.12 While enactment of Title VI ended the most blatant forms of
health care discrimination, 3 subtle barriers still prevent minorities from
gaining full
14 access to federally funded hospitals and other health care

facilities.
Health care discrimination no longer takes the form of WHITE
ONLY signs, but seemingly race neutral policies operate disproportionately against minorities, setting up barriers that exclude them from
health care. Many hospitals admit only patients who have a treating
physician with admitting privileges at that hospital. 5 Others require
substantial deposits before a patient will be treated in the emergency
room or admitted for inpatient care. 6 Increasingly, hospitals refuse to
deliver babies for mothers who have not received a certain amount of
prenatal care.

7

Both hospitals and nursing homes use a variety of poli-

cies to exclude Medicaid patients.' 8 Still other hospital business policies
10. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1982)).
II. See §§ 110 Cong. Rec. 1658 (1964).
12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1982); infra text accompanying notes 21-61.
13. See Wing, Title VT and Health Facilitie." Forms Without Substance, 30 Hastings
L.J. 137, 157-61, 176 (1978).
14. See L Jaynes & G. Williams, A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society
428-29 [hereinafter Common Destiny]; Davis, Lilie-Blanton, Lyons, Mullan, Powe &
Rowland, Health Carefor Black Americans: The Public SectorRole, 65 Milbank Memorial Fund Q. 213, 219 (1987) (Supp. 1); Miller, Race in the Health of America, 65
Milbank Memorial Fund Q. 500, 504-05 (1987) (Supp. 2); Rice & Jones, Public Policy
Compliance/EnforcementandBlack American Health: Title VT of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, in Health Care Issues in Black America 99, 101 (W. Jones & M. Rice eds. 1987);
Schlesinger, Paying the Price: Medical Care, Minorities, and the Newly Competitive
Health Care System, 65 Milbank Memorial Fund Q. 270, 275-77 (1987) (Supp. 1).
15. See Dom, Dowell & Perkins, Anti-DiscriminationProvisionsandHealth CareAccess: New Slants on Old Approaches, 20 Clearinghouse Rev. 439, 441 (1986). Since most
minorities do not have a private physician, this policy excludes most minority patients.
See Common Destiny, supra note 14, at 431; Report of the Secretary's Task Force on
Black and Minority Health, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Executive Summary, Vol. I, at 189 (1985) [hereinafter Secretary's Task Force].
16. See Dom, Dowell & Perkins, supra note 15, at 441. Thirty-four percent of
Blacks, Hispanics and Native Americans have incomes below the poverty line, compared
with only eleven percent of whites. See Secretary's Task Force, supra note 15, at 51.
Because minorities are more likely to be poor, they are also more likely to be turned away
by hospitals because they cannot pay in advance.
17. See Dorn, Dowell & Perkins, supra note 15, at 441. While eighty percent of white
women receive prenatal care during the first trimester of pregnancy, only sixty percent of
Black women receive such care. The percentages for Hispanic and Native American
women are even lower. See Secretary's Task Force, supra note 15, at 188.
18. Some nursing homes limit the number of Medicaid patients they will admit. See
Dorn, Dowel & Perkins, supra note 15, at 451. Many hospitals require that all patients
have a treating physician with admitting privileges when the only physicians with admitting privileges take few, if any, Medicaid patients. See id. at 441. Because Medicaid
patients are disproportionately minorities, these anti-Medicaid policies have the effect of
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create bilingual and bicultural barriers, including failure to provide interpreters, failure to provide translations of signs and forms, as well as preadmission inquiries into a patient's citizenship, national origin, or immigration status. 19 Each of these policies operates to exclude a disproportionately large number of minorities. Each may foreclose access to
health care if there are no alternative health care facilities in the area or
may relegate minorities to second-class care if the only alternative is
inferior.
Hospitals defend these practices by claiming that they are not enacted
with the intent to discriminate. Attending physician rules are an easy
way to ensure there will be a doctor to treat the patient. Pre-admission
deposits guarantee payment for treatment. Requiring prenatal care
reduces the chance of delivering a severely impaired baby, thereby lessening the risk of a malpractice suit. Medicaid patients are not as profitable
as privately insured patients.
In the language of civil rights laws, these policies are "facially neutral
policies that have a disproportionate adverse impact." The policies are
"facially neutral" because they may not have been enacted with the subjective intent of discriminating. Their impact is disproportionate because
they hit the poor and minorities harder than other groups. Their effect is
adverse because in the health care context such exclusionary policies can
be deadly.
Title VI litigation has so far proved to be of little assistance in ending
health care discrimination caused by these facially neutral policies with a
disproportionate impact on minorities. Title VI's implementing regulations proscribe facially neutral policies and practices that, in operation,
have the effect of disproportionately excluding minorities, regardless of
the defendant's lack of subjective discriminatory intent,20 but lower
courts have allowed hospitals to defend too easily such policies. In the
health care arena federally funded defendants have been allowed to defend successfully policies with a disproportionate adverse racial impact
by a mere showing that the policies are rationally related to any legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose.
Part I of this Article traces the development of Title VI and the implementing regulations that prohibit facially neutral policies that disproportionately exclude minority patients. Part H discusses the debate about
and subsequent adoption of disproportionate adverse impact discrimination theory into Title VI litigation. Because the concept of the defendant's response to a prima facie case of disproportionate adverse impact
discrimination has received the most attention and development in the
context of Title VII employment discrimination, Part I analyzes the
development of and the Supreme Court's increasing deference to emblocking minority access. See Dallek, Health CareforAmerica'sPoor: Separate and Unequal, 20 Clearinghouse Rev. 361, 365-371 (1986).
19. See Dorn, Dowell & Perkins, supra note 15, at 441.
20. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b)(2) (1989).
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ployer discretion in Title VII cases. Part IV examines the use of Title
VII concepts by courts analyzing Title VI cases outside the health care
context. Part V examines the even more deferential standard for the defendant's justification fashioned by circuit courts in Title VI health care
litigation, and exposes the lack of a rationale for this more deferential
treatment. Part VI explains why Title VI evidentiary burdens should not
be tied to Title VII theories.
Part VII concludes that federally funded health care providers should
carry a heavy burden to justify a facially neutral policy that excludes a
disproportionate number of minority patients. Such defendants should
have to prove that the policy significantly furthers an important legitimate program objective that cannot be substantially accomplished
through less discriminatory means.
The present status of minority health combined with the Congressional spending power underlying Title VI favor a more stringent burden
of justification in Title VI health care cases than that recently articulated
by the Supreme Court in Title VII cases. The American health care system as it presently operates is not meeting the needs of America's minority population. A deferential standard of justification allows health care
business to continue as usual, but business as usual has not made health
care accessible to America's minorities. A burden of justification that
focuses on less discriminatory alternatives will encourage the development of new approaches to health care administration that will help
bring minority patients into federally funded health care programs.
I. TITLE VI AND ITS IMPLEmENTING REGULATIONS
Title VI was enacted as part of the package that comprised the 1964
Civil Rights Act.2 1 Its operative section provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.'
While Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination, is authorized by Congress's power under the commerce clause to regulate
purely private interstate commerce,' Title VI is authorized by Con21. Title , 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982) (voting rights); Title II, id. § 2000a (public accommodations); Title III, id. § 2000b (establishments affecting interstate commerce); Title IV, id. §§ 2000c-2000c-9 (public education); Title V, id. §§ 1975a-1975d (U.S. Civil
Rights Commission); Title VI, id. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (federally funded programs and ac-

tivities); Title VII, id. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (employment); Title VIII, id. § 2000f (Secretary
of Commerce to compile registration and voting statistics); Title IX, 28 U.S.C. § 1447
(1982) (procedure after removal of suits from state court to federal court; authorization
of Attorney General to intervene in civil rights suits); Title X, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000g-2000g3 (1982) (community relations service); Title XI, id. §§ 2000h-2000h-6 (miscellaneous
provisions).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
23. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979).
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gress's power under the spending clause.24 Title VI rests on the power of
Congress to fix the terms on which federal funds are made available.25 It
does not impose obligations; instead, it creates an option-accept federal
money 26
and do not discriminate, or discriminate and do not get federal
money.

Title VI's non-discrimination requirements reach "recipients" of "federal financial assistance." Federal financial assistance includes federal
money awarded through grant, loan or contract, although it does not

include federal contracts of insurance or guaranty.27 A "recipient" is
any public or private entity that receives this federal financial assistance. 28 The purpose of Title VI is to ensure that these recipients of federal money do not discriminate in providing services, money or goods to

the ultimate beneficiaries of the programs.2 9 It does not apply to employment practices except where a primary objective of the federal financial

assistance is to provide employment."
Today, almost every hospital and nursing home accepts federal finan-

cial assistance in the form of Medicaid and Medicare and therefore is
subject to Title VI's non-discrimination requirement.31 In fiscal year
24. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983).
25. See 110 Cong. Rec. 6546 (1964) (statement of Senator Humphrey).
26. See id. at 1542 (statement of Representative Lindsey).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 (1982) (nothing in
Title VI "shall add to or detract from any existing authority with respect to any program
or activity under which Federal financial assistance is extended by way of a contract of

insurance or guaranty.").

28. Implementing regulations define recipients as:
[A]ny State, political subdivision of any State, or instrumentality of any State or
political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, or organization,
or other entity, or any individual, in any State, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended, directly or through another recipient, for any program, including any successor, assign, or transferee thereof, but such term does not
include any ultimate beneficiary under any such program.
45 C.F.R. § 80.13(i) (1989).
29. See Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort-A Report of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights 5-6 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 CivilRights]. Recipients do not
include the ultimate beneficiaries who receive money and services from the programs and
activities that receive federal assistance. Thus, farmers who receive price support payments and poor people who receive welfare and food stamps are not subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VI. See, eg., The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement
Effort-A Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights 9 (1974) [hereinafter
1974 Civil Rights]. Neither does Title VI extend to the many programs, such as social
security and veterans benefits, in which the federal government directly distributes money
to beneficiaries. See id.
30. "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action
under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any employment
practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-3 (1982).
31. More than 6,800 hospitals and 13,700 outpatient and primary care facilities receive federal financial assistance, primarily in the form of Medicaid and Medicare. See
Rice & Jones, supra note 14, at 100.
Both Medicaid and Medicare are "federal financial assistance" for purposes of Title VI.

1990]

REINVIGORA TING TITLE VI

945

1987, over seven hundred federal programs administered by twenty-six
federal agencies were subject to Title VI. Federal allocations for these
programs amounted to over $208 billion.32 Title VI applies to a wide
range of federally funded activities, from hospital and nursing homes that
receive Medicaid and Medicare, 33 to public schools, 34 private colleges

and universities,35- state and local governments, 36 and even highway construction projects that receive federal money.
Title VI prohibits discrimination in any "program or activity" that
receives federal funds. 38 Title VI defines "program or activity" broadly
so that, generally, Title VI prohibits discrimination throughout an entire
agency or institution if any part receives federal financial assistance.39
Title VI differs from the other titles of the Civil Rights Act because it
See Frazier v. Board of Trustees of Northwest Miss. Regional Medical Center, 765 F.2d

1278, 1289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986); United States v. Baylor
Univ. Medical Center, 736 F.2d 1039, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1189 (1985). Title VI regulations list a number of other health grant programs
that also provide federal financial assistance including health planning grants, loans and
loan guarantees for hospitals and other medical facilities, Maternal and Child Health
grants, and Crippled Children Services grants. See 45 C.F.R. § 80 app. A (1989).
32. See Letter from Stewart B. Oneglia, Chief, Coordination & Review Section, Civil
Rights Division, Department of Justice to Sidney Watson (Feb. 3, 1989) (on file at Fordham Law Review).
33. See 45 C.F.R. § 80 app. A. (1989); Frazier v. Board of Trustees of Northwest
Miss. Regional Medical Center, 765 F.2d 1278, 1289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1142 (1986); United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 736 F.2d 1039, 1046
(5th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
34. See 34 C.F.1L Part 100 app. B (1989).
35. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 602 (D.S.C. 1974) (private university qualifies as "receiving federal financial assistance" under Title VI where
student is directly paid veteran's educational benefits), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir.
1975).
36. See, e.g., Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion v. Secretary of Hous. and Urban
Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 776 (1st Cir. 1986) (Title VI prohibition on discrimination applied to
local housing program).
37. See 49 C.F.R. Part. 21 app. C(a)(2) (1989).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
39. Lower courts had interpreted the "program or activity" language in Title VI to
give the statute a broad, institution-wide application, but in Grove City College v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555 (1984), the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase narrowly and held that
Title IX (which is modeled after Title VI) prohibits discrimination only in the particular
educational program or activity receiving the federal assistance, not in all the educational
programs and activities conducted by the recipient institution. See id. at 570-73.
In 1988 Congress overrode a presidential veto and enacted the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (the "Act"). The Act amends Title
VI and the other anti-discrimination acts that are modeled on Title VI by adding provisions to define the meaning of the phrase "program or activity." For educational institutions where federal aid is extended anywhere within a college, university, or public
system of higher education, the entire institution or system is covered. If federal aid is
extended anywhere in an elementary or secondary school system, the entire system is
covered. For state and local governments, only the department or agency that receives
the aid is covered. Where one entity of a state or local government receives federal aid
and distributes it to another department, both entities are covered. For private corporations, if the aid is extended to the corporation as a whole, or if the corporation provides a
public service, such as health care, social services, education, or housing, the entire cor-
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relies primarily on administrative rather than judicial enforcement." Ti-

tle VI's proponents saw it primarily as a means to secure administrative
enforcement of school desegregation in states where courts had been ineffective in dismantling segregation.4 ' Thus, Title VI's authors drafted an
administrative compliance mechanism empowering the federal agencies
that award federal financial assistance to refuse to grant funds and to

terminate funding to any recipient found in violation of the Title VI regulations after an opportunity for an administrative hearing.4 2 The federal
agency does not need to seek a court order, but the fund recipient may
seek judicial review of agency action.4 3
Although a federal funding recipient may not discriminate in any of its

activities if any part receives federal financial assistance,' the administrative sanction for violation of Title VI is termination of federal funds
only to the "particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found."4

Federal funds earmarked for a specific

purpose are not terminated unless discrimination is found in the use of
those funds or the use of those funds is infected by discrimination elsewhere in the operation of the recipient.4 6
Although Title VI provides expressly only for administrative enforce-

ment, the Supreme Court has implied a cause of action for private individuals to sue to enforce both the statute and its implementing
regulations. 47 The remedies available to a private plaintiff in a court action do not include termination of federal funding, but a plaintiff who

poration is covered. If the federal aid is extended to only one geographically separate
facility, only that facility is covered. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d4-a (1988).
40. See Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964--Implementation and Impact, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 824, 824 (1968).
41. See Wing, supra note 13, at 152. In 1965 there were 2000 school districts still
operating in open defiance of Brown. See Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has
Come: AntidiscriminationLaw in the Second DecadeAfter Brown v. Board of Education,
41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 742, 756 (1974).
42. Section 602 provides for an opportunity for a hearing prior to termination or a
final refusal to grant assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1982). Section 603 provides
for judicial review of such actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1982).
43. Section 2000d-2 states:
Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 2000d-1 of this title
shall be subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law for
similar action taken by such department or agency on other grounds. In the
case of action, not otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing
to grant or to continue financial assistance upon a finding of failure to comply
with any requirement imposed pursuant to section 2000d-I of this title, any
person aggrieved (including any State or political subdivision thereof and any
agency of either) may obtain judicial review of such action in accordance with
chapter 7 of title 5 [5 U.S.C. 701-706] and such action shall not be deemed
committed to unreviewable agency discretion within the meaning of that
chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1982).
44. See supra note 39.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
46. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1079 (5th Cir. 1969).
47. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983) (White,

1990]

REINVIGORATING TITLE VI

947

proves intentional discrimination can recover both equitable retrospective and prospective relief, including backpay.4 8 The Court has not yet
addressed whether such a plaintiff can also recover damages. 49 The
Court has also left open the question of the relief available to a Title VI
plaintiff who proves disproportionate adverse impact discrimination but
who does not prove intent to discriminate.5" While the eleventh amendment prohibits Title VI suits in federal court against a state for compen
satory monetary damages, 1 this prohibition does not extend to suits
against state officials for prospective injunctive relief.5 2
Title VI does not specifically define "discrimination." Rather, it directs each federal administrative agency that extends federal financial
assistance to promulgate and enforce "rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability" effectuating the provisions of Title VI. 53 Soon after
passage of Title VI, a task force composed of representatives of the White
House, the Commission on Civil Rights, the Justice Department and the
Bureau of the Budget was created to develop consistent, enforceable Title
VI regulations.5 4 The challenge was to write regulations that would not
be so general as to be meaningless, but that would take into account the
peculiarities of the many programs subject to Title VI and be flexible
enough to meet each agency's needs.55 The task force first developed
regulations for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
J., joined by Rehnquist, J.); id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and
Blackmun, J.J.); id. at 625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 602-03 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, 3.); id. at 612 (O'Connor, 3.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 624-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 635-39 (Stevens,
Brennan and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting); text accompanying notes 96-101; see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1984) (back pay).
49. See id. at 630.
50. See infira notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
51. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1985) (suit against
California State Hospital and California Department of Mental Health under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
52. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985), Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
53. Section 2000d-1 reads in part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d
of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in
connection with which the action is taken.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).

During debate on the bill, Attorney General Robert Kennedy pointed out that this
delegation of authority to define prohibited discrimination was necessary because" 'there
are so many different programs'... 'to try to write out something specifically in legislation as to what should be done, and what rules and regulations would be issued is virtually impossible.'" Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for
Defining "Discrimination," 70 Geo. L.J. 1, 30 (1981) (quoting Congressional Record).
54. See Comment, supra note 40, at 846.
55. See Id.
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("HEW")5 6 and then used these regulations as a standard for the other
agencies.17 Ultimately, the task force drafted twenty-two sets of Title VI
regulations. Each set was modeled after the initial HEW regulations,
and all follow its general pattern with minimal variation.58 With only
relatively minor modification, these regulations continue in force today.59
The Title VI regulations all define prohibited "discrimination" in the
same general terms prohibiting, among other things: "criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the
effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race,
color, or national origin."' While the administrative agencies charged
with enforcing Title VI have been unanimous and consistent in concluding that Title V1 should prohibit policies and practices that have a disproportionate adverse impact on minorities, the Supreme Court has been
neither unanimous nor consistent.

II. DISPROPORTIONATE ADVERSE IMPACT THEORY AND TITLE VI
For two decades courts have categorized allegations of discrimination
according to two analytical frameworks: disparate treatment and disproportionate adverse impact. Disparate treatment discrimination involves
claims of intentional discrimination. The plaintiff must prove a discriminatory motive, but the court may infer this motive from circumstantial
evidence. Disproportionate adverse impact discrimination is not concerned with the defendant's mental state: motive is irrelevant. Disproportionate adverse impact outlaws practices that are facially race neutral
but that fall more harshly on minorities and that cannot be justified. It is
an objective theory that requires proof of facts independent of the de56. The initial HEW Title VI regulations applied to hospitals, nursing homes and
clinics that receive federal finding as well as to a vast array of other programs administered by HEW, including but not limited to primary and secondary education, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), vocational rehabilitation services, and juvenile delinquency projects. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.2 app. A (1989).
57. See Comment, supra note 40, at 846.
58. See id.; 1971 Civil Rights, supra note 29, at 181; U.S. Comm'n of Civil Rights,
Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort 554-55 (1970).
59. See Wing, supra note 13, at 155.

60. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1)(vii)(2) (1989); see also 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (1989) (Agriculture); 15 C.F.R. § 8A(b)(2) (1989) (Commerce); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1989) (Edu-

cation); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.13(b)(7)(c) (1989) (Energy); 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(i) (1989)
(Housing and Urban Development); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (1989) (Justice); 29 C.F.R.

§ 31.3(b)(2) (1989) (Labor); 22 C.F.R. § 141.3(b)(2) (1989) (State); 49 C.F.R.

§ 21.5(b)(2) (1989) (Transportation); 31 C.F.R. § 51.52(b)(vi) (1989) (Treasury). 43

C.F.R. § 17.3(b)(2) (1988) (Interior); 32 C.F.R. § 300.4(b)(2) (1988) (Defense); Title VI
regulations also define discrimination to include: any difference in quality, 45 C.F.R.

§ 80.3(b)(1)(i) (1989), quantity or the manner in which the benefit is provided; and construction of a facility in a location with the purpose or effect of excluding individuals
from the benefits of any program on the grounds of race, color, or national origin. See 45
C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1)-(3) (1989).
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lations prohibiting a discriminatory impact were a valid exercise of delegated administrative law-making. 8 Justice White merely concurred in
the result without explanation.69
Lau's status was unchallenged until 1978, when, in Regents of the University of Californiav. .Bakke,7" five justices concluded that Title VI does
not prohibit a recipient of federal funds from taking race into account in
an affirmative action program designed to eliminate the vestiges of past
discrimination. The special minority admissions program at the Medical
School at the University of California, Davis deliberately used racial criteria, eliminating the need for the Court to address the question of
whether proof of discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a violation of Title VI. However, in reaching the conclusion that the school's
affirmative action program did not violate Title VI, a majority reasoned
that Title VI's reach was co-extensive with that of the Equal Protection
Clause.71 Because the Court had previously held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits only intentional discrimination, 7 Bakke cast doubt
on the continued validity of Lau's holding that proof of discriminatory
impact suffices to establish a violation of Title VI. 7
The Court next revisited the issue of the reach of Title VI in Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission.74 Black and Hispanic police officers filed a class action challenging the use of written examinations to
make entry level appointments to the New York City Police Department.
Minorities as a group scored lower on the tests than did whites. Because
appointments were made in the order of test scores, the examination
caused minority officers to be hired later than similarly situated whites.
When the New York Police Department laid off police officers on a "lasthired, first-fired" basis, the officers with the lowest scores on the challenged examinations were laid off first, causing proportionately more
Black and Hispanic officers to be fired.75
In response, the plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that the examinations violated Title VI and Title VII because they had a dispropor68. See id. at 570-71 (Stewart, Burger, and Blackmun, JYL,concurring).

69. See id. at 569 (White, J., concurring).
70. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

71. See id. at 287; id. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring).
72. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
73. Compare Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 1981),

cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983) (Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent) and
Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1000 (5th Cir. 1981) (same) and Lora v. Board of
Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980) (same) with NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,
657 F.2d 1322, 1328 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) (Title VI prohibits neutral policies with
discriminatory impact) and Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 589 (2d Cir. 1978)

(same), aff'd on othergrounds sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979)
and Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1029
n.6 (9th Cir. 1978) (same).
74. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).

75. See id. at 585.
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fendant's state of mind. Proof of impermissible motive is immaterial, but
the defendant may avoid liability by justifying the need for the facially
neutral practice.
These two analytical frameworks serve different purposes and seek to
effectuate two different theoretical conceptions of equality. The disparate
treatment theory reflects the equal treatment conception of equality:
Blacks and whites are entitled to like treatment, and considerations of
race should not influence most decisions. In contrast, the disproportionate adverse impact theory reflects an equal opportunity conception of
equality. It imposes an affirmative duty on defendants to heed the disproportionate consequences of their policies because structural, historical, or societal barriers have impeded equal achievement. The equal
opportunity concept of equality also teaches that arbitrary or thoughtless
policies can be just as harmful as intentional discrimination. 6
Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination and disproportionate adverse impact discrimination,6" while the Constitution prohibits
only intentional discrimination.6" The issue of whether Title VI and its
implementing regulations proscribe unintentional discrimination with a
disproportionate adverse impact has had a tortured history in the
Supreme Court.
In 1974, in Lau v. Nichols," a unanimous Supreme Court held that the
San Francisco school system's facially neutral policy of not providing
supplemental English language instruction violated Title VI because it
had the effect of excluding non-English speaking Chinese students from
the school system's educational programs.6" Although the Supreme
Court has subsequently cited Lau as holding that Title VI forbids disproportionate adverse impact discrimination,6 6 the opinions are not that
sweeping. The five-justice majority opinion relied on the express language of the Title VI regulations prohibiting practices that have the effect
of subjecting individuals to discrimination, and assumed that the statutory mandate was consistent with the regulatory language.6 7 Three concurring justices concluded that although it was not clear what
discriminatory acts were prohibited by Title VI standing alone, the regu61. For a further discussion of the conceptions of equality embedded in antidiscrmination laws, see Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of
the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90 Harv. L. Rev. I (1976); see also Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination,125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540, 553-54 (1977)
(discussing discrimination involving no motivational element).
62. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977).
63. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).

64. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
65. See id. at 568.
66. See, eg., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 589 (1983); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (citing Lau to support proposition that Supreme Court
will uphold congressional exercise of spending power to induce parties to comply with
federal policy).
67. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 566-68.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

of Title VI. Instead the case generated five opinions which in the words
of Justice Powell "further confuse rather than guide." 5 On the question
of whether Title VI itself forbids policies that have a disproportionate
adverse impact on minorities, counting the votes in Guardianswithout
the benefit of a true opinion of the Court has led the justices to rationalize their disparate agglomerations of votes as "holdings."
In Alexander v. Choate"6 the Court referred to a majority in Guardians
as "holding" that Title VI itself, apart from its regulations, reaches only
intentional discrimination. 7 Seven justices, in three separate opinions,
agreed that Title VI requires proof of intent to discriminate. 8 None of
these opinions undertook to examine the history of the statute or the
regulations to reach this conclusion; rather, all seven justices felt compelled by the stare decisis effect of the Bakke holding that Title VI was
coextensive with the Constitution. 9
The Alexander court also referred to Guardiansas "holding" that the
Title VI implementing regulations that prohibit facially neutral policies
having an unjustified disparate impact are valid.90 A different five-justice
majority concluded that Bakke did not overrule Lau's concurring opinion which concluded that even if Title VI does not proscribe unintentional racial discrimination, it permits federal agencies to promulgate
valid regulations that do prohibit such discrimination. 9 1 Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concluded that the regulations prohibiting "criteria... which.., have the effect.. ." of discriminating are valid because they are "reasonably related" to Title VIs
affirmed on the ground that there is no private right of action under Title VI. See id. at
608-10 (Powell, Burger, J.J., concurring in judgment).
85. Id. at 608.
86. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
87. See id. at 293.
88. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 607-08 (1983) (Powell,
Burger, Rehnquist, J.J., concurring in judgment); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment); id. at 634 (Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, J.3., dissenting).
89. Only Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion undertook an analysis of the legislative history of Title VI. Justice Marshall concluded, based upon the legislative history
and consistent administrative interpretation, that Title VI prohibits disparate impact discrimination. See id. at 616-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White also concluded
that Title VI reached disparate impact regulation, but he relied on the concurring opinion
in Lau. See id. at 592.
90. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985). Six circuits have cited Guard-

ians as holding that a cause of action premised on Title VI regulations does not require
proof of discriminatory intent. See Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987);
Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774,
785 n.20 (Ist Cir. 1986); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-83 (9th Cir. 1986); Craft v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of IM., 793 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 479 U.S. 829
(1986); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456,465 n.ll (5th Cir. 1986); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417-18 (11th Cir. 1985).
91. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1983) (White,
J.); id. at 643 (Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, J.., dissenting); id. at 623 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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tionate impact on minority applicants.7 6 The district court ultimately

held that an implied private right of action existed under Title V177 and
that proof of discriminatory effect was enough to establish a violation of
Title VI. The trial court rejected the Police Department's argument that
only proof of discriminatory intent could suffice. 78 The district court
granted certain relief under Title VII and also granted additional relief

under Title VI. The district court found that all forms of traditional
equitable relief were available under Title VI and awarded, among other
things, constructive
seniority, backpay, and back medical and insurance
79

benefits.

The Second Circuit affirmed the Title VII relief but reversed as to Title
VI.8 0 Two judges held that the trial court erred in its conclusion that
Title VI did not require proof of discriminatory intent."1 The third member of the panel, Judge Meskill, refused to reach the issue of whether

Title VI required proof of discriminatory intent, relying instead on the
novel conclusion that private plaintiffs cannot obtain compensatory relief
for violations of Title VI.82 Judge Meskill characterized the district
court's award of equitable relief--constructive seniority, backpay and
other back benefits-as retrospective and compensatory, and reversed the

district court on this ground. 3

Five members of the Court voted to affirm the Second Circuit,
although they could not agree on the grounds; 4 consequently, the
Supreme Court missed its opportunity in Guardiansto clarify the reach
76. See id. at 585-86.
77. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1281-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1228 (1983), vacated, 633 F.2d 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). The district court initially held that the layoffs constituted employment discrimination in violation of Title VII. That decision was rendered untenable, however, by the
Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977), that a bona fide seniority system that merely perpetuates the effects
of pre-title VII discrimination is protected by section 703(h) of the Act. See id. at 352-53.
The discrimination at issue in Guardianstook place before Congress extended Title VII
to cover municipalities in 1972, and was thus immune from Title VII attack under Teamsters. Thus, later stages of Guardians proceed under Title VI, which has always been
applicable to municipalities. See Guardians,463 U.S. at 587.
78. See Guardians,466 F. Supp. at 1285-87.
79. See id. at 1287; Guardians,463 U.S. at 604-05.
80. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1228 (1983).
81. See id. at 274-75 (Cofirin, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 255-63.
83. See id. at 255-56, 263.
84. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist as well as the Chief Justice, concluded
that Title VI required a showing of intentional discrimination. See Guardians,463 U.S.
at 610-11 (Powell, Rehnquist, Burger, J.J., concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor
wrote separately, also concluding that purposeful discrimination is a necessary element of
a Title VI claim. See id. at 613-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Justice
White, joined by Justice Rehnquist concluded that a Title VI plaintiff should recover only
injunctive, noncompensatory relief for a defendant's unintentional violation of Title VI,
and that such relief did not include an award of constructive seniority. See id. at 595-607
(White, Rehnquist, J.1.). Alternatively, Justice Powell joined by Chief Justice Burger
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tiffs.I"o Justice O'Connor, while voting to affirm on the ground that
proof of intent was required, agreed that both prospective and retrospective equitable relief were available to all Title VI plaintiffs, but reserved
judgment on the question of whether there is a private cause of action for
damages relief under Title VI.10 1
Since Guardians,the Court has not addressed directly the question of
whether plaintiffs who prove disproportionate adverse impact discrimination may recover retroactive, equitable relief. However, a unanimous
Court has cited Guardianssaying that "[a] majority of the Court agreed
that retroactive relief is available to private plaintiffs for all discrimina-

tion, whether intentional or unintentional, that is actionable under Title
VI. 102 The Court has not characterized this majority vote as a "holding," although it has so characterized its majority votes on disproportionate adverse impact theory; thus, the precedential effect of the
remedies vote, given the change in Supreme Court personnel since
Guardians,is unknown. In any event, the remedies question is generally
of marginal importance only in Title VI health care cases because such
actions typically seek prospective injunctive relief rather than any form
of retrospective relief."13
In its tortured way Guardiansresolved that Title VI plaintiffs can prevail upon a showing of disproportionate adverse impact. Yet because the
Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's reversal of the trial court's
judgment, Guardiansdid not reach the issue of the parties' evidentiary
burdens in a Title VI disproportionate adverse impact discrimination
suit.1 0 These issues are crucial. The nature of the defenses available in a
100. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 624-34 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 635-39 (Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, J.1., dissenting).
101. See id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 n.9 (1984). Consolidated
Rail involved a claim brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at
626. Section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act provides to plaintiffs under Section 504
the remedies set forth in Title VI. See id. Citing Guardians,the Court held that the
plaintiffs, having alleged intentional discrimination, could recover back pay. See id. at
631. The court did not explain why back pay constituted equitable relief.
103. See, eg., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1980) (suit to enjoin closing
of one of New York City's seventeen public hospitals); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,
657 F.2d 1322, 1324 (3d Cir. 1981) (suit to enjoin implementation of proposed relocation
and reorganization plan of private, non-profit hospital); Cook v. Ochsner Foundation
Hosp., Civ. No. 79-1969 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 1979) (suit to enjoin use of hospital admission
criteria that had the effect of excluding Black patients).
The issue of the availability of compensatory relief is of critical importance in Title VI
cases alleging discrimination in employment. Plaintiffs have traditionally brought these
cases under Title VII rather than Title VI. However, the Supreme Court's recent hostility to Title VII disparate impact claims now makes a Title VI claim more attractive.
Prevailing Title VI plaintiffs can recover attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
104. Three justices did mention the defendant's burden ofjustification. Justices White
and Rehnquist characterized the defendant's burden as one of proving the affirmative
defense of "business necessity." See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S.
582, 592 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). Justice Marshall
characterized the defendant's burden as that of proving a "sufficient nondiscriminatory
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purpose of ending discrimination in federally funded programs. 92 Justice
White, joined by Justice Marshall, reached the same conclusion under a
standard that inquired whether the regulations were "clearly inconsistent" with the statute. 3
Thus, Guardiansresolved that private Title VI plaintiffs can prevail
upon a showing of disproportionate adverse impact without proof of intent to discriminate as long as they are careful to allege a violation of the
Title VI regulations. The case left open, though, the question of the relief
available to such plaintiffs. Justice White's opinion, which is denominated the opinion of the Court,94 has confused commentators and courts
who have misread it as reflecting the views of a majority of the Court.95
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued that only injunctive
non-compensatory relief should be available absent a showing of discriminatory intent.96 Although Justice White's vote was decisive in affirming
the Second Circuit,97 his view that the scope of relief should be limited
was rejected by a majority of the Court.9"
Yet a different Guardiansmajority than those that coalesced around
the intent versus impact issues concluded that both prospective and retrospective equitable relief are available to Title VI plaintiffs who prove
either intentional or unintentional discrimination.9 9 Justices Stevens,
Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall reasoned that both prospective and
retrospective legal and equitable relief were available to all Title VI plain92. See id. at 64245 (Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, J.J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 592-93 (White, J.); id. at 623 (Marshall, 1., dissenting).
94. See id. at 584.
95. See Dom, Dowell & Perkins, supra note 15, at 444; Solomon, Constraintson
Damage Claims Under Title VIof the Civil RightsAct, 3 L. & Inequality 183, 185 (1985).
See also Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Schools, 725 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984) (Section
504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act remedies); Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. School Dist.,
714 F.2d 1348, 1356-57 (5th Cir. 1983) (same).
96. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 602-03 (1983) (White,

J.,)

97. See supra note 84.
98. In Guardians,Justice White opined that a majority of the Court agreed with his
conclusion that compensatory relief was not available under Title VI absent proof of
discriminatory intent. See Guardians,463 U.S. at 607 n.27. However, Justice White
appears to have overstated the reasons behind his fellow justices' votes. See id. at 612
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 624-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 635-39 (Stevens,
Brennan, Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465
U.S. 624, 630 n.9 (1984) (court counting votes in Guardians).
99. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 612 (1983) (O'Connor,
3., concurring); id. at 624-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 635-39 (Stevens, Brennan,
Blackmun, J.J., dissenting); ConsolidatedRail Corp., 465 U.S. at 630 n.9 (court counting
votes in Guardians).
Although a majority of the Court concluded that Title VI plaintiffs who prove disparate impact discrimination may recover retrospective equitable relief, the Guardians
plaintiffs were denied back pay, back benefits and back seniority. Justice White, who cast
the majority vote that the Title VI regulations were valid, also voted with four other
justices to affirm the Second Circuit's judgment reversing the trial court's award of relief
to plaintiffs. See supra note 84.
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Title VI disproportionate adverse impact case-which party has the burden of producing evidence, and who bears the risk of non-persuasioncan be determinative of the outcome in any Title VI case.10 5 These Title
VI questions remain unsettled.
HI.

THE DEFENDANT'S BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION
UNDER TITLE VII

The parties' evidentiary burdens in disproportionate adverse impact
analysis have received the greatest attention and development in the setting of Title VII. The evidentiary standards developed in Title VII cases
have been used to analyze disproportionate adverse impact claims
brought under other statutes, including Title VI.10 6 Because the Title
VII evidentiary standards have been the starting point for the courts'
analysis of the appropriate standards for Title VI cases, this section will
briefly review the Title VII evidentiary burdens, with special attention to
the defendant's burden of justification in a case of disparate impact.
Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination and facially neutral
practices that have an unjustified disproportionate adverse impact on
protected groups.107 The courts have developed proof models for each
type of Title VII discrimination case. The disparate treatment model addresses intentional discrimination, and the disparate impact model is
used for neutral polices with a disproportionate adverse impact. Unfortunately, the Court's recent decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio "o has blurred the distinctions between the two models while lessening the burden on the defendant in a disproportionate adverse impact
case.
A.

Title VII DisparateTreatment Model

Title VII claims of disparate treatment involve both claims of intentional discrimination against individuals and claims of intentional discrimination against an entire class of people. m9 To prove either an
individual or a systemic claim, the plaintiff must prove intent to discriminate. Since direct evidence of discriminatory motive is usually unavailajustification." See id. at 623 n.15 (relying on Judge Kearse's concurring opinion in a Title
VI case, Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 621-28 (2d Cir. 1980)).
105. See Belton, Burdens of Pleadingand Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a

Theory of ProceduralJustice, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1205, 1207 (1981).
106. See Ziegler, DisparateImpactAnalysis and the Age Discriminationin Employment
Act, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 1038, 1039 (1984); Note, Business Necessity in Title V1III Importing an Employment DiscriminationDoctrine into the FairHousing Act, 54 Fordham L.

Rev. 563, 580 (1986).
107. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806-07 (1973); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971).
108. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
109. Classwide claims are often referred to as systemic disparate treatment or "pattern-or-practice cases." See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.

324, 357 (1977).

956
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ble, most cases of intentional discrimination involve the use of

circumstantial evidence. 110 This discussion of the disparate treatment
model is limited to cases of inferential disparate treatment.1 11
The three-step proof model for inferential disparate treatment claims is
designed to focus on circumstantial evidence in an effort to uncover the
defendant's true motive. The three stages of proof for this kind of a disparate treatment case are: (1) the plaintiff's prima facie case, (2) the
defendant's claim of legitimate business reason, and (3) the plaintiff's
proof that the defendant's legitimate business reason is a mere pretext for
race or gender discrimination."1 2
First, an individual plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of individual inferential disparate treatment by introducing evidence:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (li) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to113seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
In systemic disparate treatment cases, the circumstantial evidence takes
the form of statistical evidence showing a gross underrepresentation of
protected group members in the employer's workforce as compared to
the numbers interested and qualified to hold the positions.1 14
The prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination. The circumstantial evidence in an individual case eliminates the most common
reasons for rejecting a job applicant, 11 5 while the statistical evidence in a
mass or systemic case shows that the racial make-up of the employer's
work force varies substantially from what would be expected absent discrimination.1 16 Both give rise to a rebuttable presumption
that the de117
fendant acted because of a discriminatory motive.
In order to rebut the inference of discrimination, the defendant needs
only to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
110. See Note, Indirect Proofof DiscriminatoryMotive in Title VII DisparateTreatment ClaimsAfter Aikens, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1114, 1116 (1988).

111. The only defense to a case of direct disparate treatment is a bona fide occupa-

tional qualification, a burden which is extremely difficult to satisfy. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
112. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S, 324, 336-42

(1977).
113. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (footnote omitted).
114. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-13 (1977); Team-

sters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; see also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (suit alleging
racial discrimination in employment and provision of services by the North Carolina
Agricultural Extension Service).

115. See Furneo Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
116. See Shoben, DifferentialPass-FailRates in Employment Testing: StatisticalProof
Under Title VII, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 793, 793 (1978).

117. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
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touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be27 shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."'1
Disproportionate adverse impact analysis, like disparate treatment
analysis, proceeds in three steps: (1) the plaintiff's prima facie case, (2)
the defendant's business justification, and (3) plaintiff's offer
of less dis128
criminatory alternatives to cast doubt on that justification.
First, to establish a prima facie case of disproportionate adverse impact, a plaintiff must identify the facially neutral barrier and use statistics
to establish a significant adverse effect upon a minority group. 129 While
both inferential disparate treatment and disproportionate adverse impact
use statistics to establish a prima facie case,' 30 in an inferential disparate
treatment case the statistics are circumstantial evidence that merely create an inference of illegal intent, while in a disparate impact case the
statistics are direct evidence of the ultimate issue: that a facially neutral
employment policy or practice has an unequal impact on minorities.
Second, once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of disproportionate adverse impact, the focus of the analysis shifts to whether the challenged practice can be justified because it will "serve[ ], in a significant
way, the legitimate goals of the employer."'' This second stage has been
the crux of most disproportionate adverse impact cases.
Third, if the defendant carries its burden of showing business justification, the case enters the third stage of the analysis in which the plaintiff
must prove that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate [hiring]
interest."' 132 Few Title VII cases reach this third analytical stage, and
127. Id. at 431.
128. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2124-27 (1989); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977). These steps guide
the course of the analysis, but do not guide the course of the trial. Plaintiffs may, and
generally do, present evidence relevant to stage three of the analysis during their prima
facie case.
129. In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court stated that to establish a prima facie case the
plaintiff must: (1) show a significant disparate impact on a protected class; (2) identify
the specific employment practice or selection criteria; and (3) show the causal relationship between the identified practices and the impact. See Wards Cove, 109 S. CL at 212425; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
130. Disproportionate adverse impact cases have not used the same sophisticated statistical techniques required in inferential disparate treatment claims, but Justice White's
opinion in Wards Cove may signal that the methods of statistical analysis developed in
inferential disparate treatment cases will now be applied to adverse disproportionate impact claims as well. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121 n.6.
131. Id. at 2125-26.
132. Ad. at 2126 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
The Court has said that evidence of less discriminatory alternatives would establish that
the "employer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination." Albemarle,
422 U.S. at 425. Use of the term "pretext" in the disproportionate adverse impact discrimination context is troublesome because intent to discriminate should be irrelevant.
Some scholars have suggested that "pretext" merely signals a "less restrictive alternative"
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treatment accorded the plaintiff.11 In Texas Departmentof Community
Affairs v. Burdine,119 the Supreme Court held that the defendant's burden is merely one of production. The employer need only introduce
some evidence of a legitimate reason; he does not need to convince the
trier of fact that it was more likely than not the real reason for the employment decision. 2 '
The plaintiff's prima facie case of inferential disparate treatment is easily established and does not point reliably to discrimination as the cause
or even a cause of the challenged practice; thus, the content of the defendant's response is also fairly low.1"' In Burdine the Court ruled that
any lawful purpose articulated by the defendant will suffice to rebut the
presumption of discrimination arising from plaintiff's prima facie proof.
Because the heart of a disparate treatment claim is purposeful discrimination, any purpose other than a purpose to discriminate satisfies the
defendant's rebuttal burden."2
Third, if the defendant satisfies his burden, the plaintiff has an opportunity to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is a "mere pretext" for
discrimination.123 In other words, the plaintiff may discredit the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory motive or show affirmatively that the
true motive was to discriminate. Either showing will suffice to enable the
Court to conclude that the employer's stated reason was a smokescreen
to mask an unlawful reason."
This final stage is the core of a disparate treatment case, and most
cases are won or lost at this stage. 125 The nature of the evidence that the
plaintiff offers to prove pretext is determined by the ultimate fact in issue---the defendant's motive. Plaintiff's pretext proof is directed at exposing the defendant's discriminatory state of mind.
B.

Title VII DisproportionateAdverse Impact Model

While the entire focus of the circumstantial disparate treatment claim
is a search for the employer's motive and intent, in a disproportionate
adverse impact claim intent and motive are irrelevant. In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,' 2 the Court declared that what is required is "the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment .... The
118. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
119. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
120. See id. at 257-58.
121. See Segar v.Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S.
1115 (1985).
122. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981).
123. See id. at 256.
124. See Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2378 (1989); Aikens v.
United States Postal Serv. Bd., 642 F.2d 514, 520 (1980).
125. See B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 14 (2d ed. Cum.
Supp. 1988).
126. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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there are only a few 1Title
VII cases that focus on the issue of less discrim33
inatory alternatives.
Although Griggs was decided eighteen years ago, Supreme Court analysis of the defendant's burden of justification in Title VII disproportionate adverse impact cases has still not achieved precision or stability.
While early Supreme Court cases narrowly defined the defense and
placed a substantial burden on the defendant to prove the defense, the
Court's more recent decisions have allowed employers to justify more

easily practices that disproportionately exclude minorities.134 The
Court's most recent decision, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 3 '
culminates this trend, while at the same time blurring the distinctions
136

between disproportionate adverse impact and disparate treatment.

First, prior to Wards Cove lower courts and commentators were nearly
unanimous in concluding that the defendant in a disproportionate adverse impact case bore the risk of non-persuasion on business justification. 13 7 Wards Cove, though, dilutes the magnitude of the defendant's
analysis meaning that even if there is a business necessity justifying a criteria, the criteria
will still be struck down if plaintiff can prove that there is a less discriminatory alternative
available to meet the employer's business need. Alternatively, the Court could, in fact,
mean "pretext" in its usual meaning. In this sense, a practice with a disparate impact is
permissible if there is business justification for its use. But if the practice is selected over
alternative methods because it has a disparate impact, pretext is shown. In this sense, the
existence of a less restrictive alternative is persuasive, but not conclusive evidence of intent. See M. Zimmer, C. Sullivan & R. Richards, Cases and Materials on Employment
Discrimination 219 (1988).
133. See Lamber, Alternatives to ChallengedEmployee Selection Criteria: The Significance ofNonstatisticalEvidence in DisparateImpact Cases Under Title VII, 1985 Wis. L.
Rev. 1, 6 n. 18. Title VII plaintiffs rarely prevail in the third stage of a disparate impact
case by showing the existence of less discriminatory alternatives. See Booth & Mackay,
Legal Constraintson Employment Testing andEvolving Trends in the Law, 29 Emory L.J
121, 190 (1980); Rothschild & Werden, Title VII and the Use of Employment Tests: An
Illustrationof the Limits of the JudicialProcess, I1 . Legal Stud. 261, 272-73 (1982).
134. See Brodin, Costs,Profits and EqualEmployment Opportunity, 62 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 318, 344-53 (1987); Caldwell, Reaffirming the DisproportionateEffects Standardof
Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 555, 595-96 (1985); Note, Business
Necessity: JudicialDualism and the Searchfor Adequate Standards, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 376,

377 (1981).

135. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
136. Many of the developments in Wards Cove were foreshadowed by Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777,

2788 (1988).

137. All the circuits, except the Third, held that the defendant bears the burden not
only of coming forward with some evidence of business justification, but also the burden
of proof on the issue. See Washington v. Electrical Joint Apprenticeship & Training
Comm., 845 F.2d 710, 715 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 371 (1988); Wislocki-Goin
v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 113 (1988); Bunch
v. Bullard, 795 F.2d 384, 393 (5th Cir. 1986); Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 779
F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 572 (4th Cir.
1985); Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 763 F.2d 1393, 1397 (11th Cir. 1985);
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985);
Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (Ist Cir. 1984); Moore v. Hughes
Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 481 (9th Cir 1983); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Uncles Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 752-53
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burden of justification from one of persuasion to one of merely producing
evidence of business justification.1 38 Justice White's majority opinion
concedes that earlier Supreme Court decisions seem to place the ultimate
burden of proof on this issue on the defendant but instructs us to read
now "burden of proof" in those cases as having meant merely the burden
of production.1 39 This diminution is significant. According to Wards
Cove, the defendant's burden in a disproportionate adverse impact case
now conforms to the defendant's burden in a disparate treatment case."4
Thus, a disproportionate adverse impact defendant now needs only to
introduce some evidence of business justification to satisfy its burden and
move the case into the third stage. 41
Second, Wards Cove also changes the nature of the defendant's business justification defense in a disproportionate adverse impact case. In
Griggs, the Supreme Court used several different phrases to describe the
business justification defense: "business necessity," "related to job performance," "demonstrable relationship to successful performance," and
"manifest relationship to the employment in question." 14 Because the
defendant proffered no evidence on the question, the case failed to provide any precise guidelines as to the exact nature of the defense.
Before Wards Cove, most lower courts strictly construed the business
justification defense requiring that a disparately impacting policy must
"not only foster safety and efficiency, but must be essential to that
goal." 4 3 Under this strict business necessity standard, disparately im(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 646
F.2d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 1981); Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 136 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981),
aff'd, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 235
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,463 U.S. 1228 (1983). ContraCroker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d
975, 991 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) ("the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the

plaintiff").
The courts and commentators reasoned that since the impact discrimination plaintiff's
prima facie statistical case is direct evidence of the ultimate fact in issue, courts should
accord it more weight than the prima facie disparate treatment case. Courts therefore
placed a heavier burden on the defendant to rebut it, and required the defendant not only
to produce evidence of business justification but to carry the burden of persuasion on the
issue as well. See Caldwell, supra note 134, at 600; Segar,738 F.2d at 1270. While lower
courts had great difficulty in specifying the exact nature of the proof required to satisfy
the defendant's burden, "[ait a minimum, however, most courts reject[ed] generalized
assumptions, unsupported by empirical or comparable evidence, of the challenged practice's effectiveness in serving the defendant's business needs." Caldwell, supra note 134,
at 593. See Holdeman, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust. The ChangingFace of
DisparateImpact, 66 Den. U.L. Rev. 179, 196 (1989).
138. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55

(1981).

142. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
143. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971)), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); see EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 328 n.10
(8th Cir.), cert. denied,479 U.S. 910 (1986); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d
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volves an inquiry into "whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer."149
It is the Court's choice of the phrases "significantly" and "legitimate
employment goals" that creates uncertainty. Justice White did not use
the term "manifest relationship," or its oft-used companion phrases

"manifestly," "demonstrably" or "substantially" related. Rather, Wards
Cove says that the challenged practice must "significantly" further the
"legitimate employment goals" of the employer.
It may be of no importance that the Court requires a "significant"
relationship rather than a "manifest" or "demonstrable" one. Some
to describe the standard under a
lower courts have used "significantly"
"manifest relationship" test.15 Similarly, the Supreme Court has used
the words "significant" and "substantial" interchangeably to describe the

disproportionate adverse impact plaintiff's prima facie statistical

burden.' 5
Potentially more troubling is the Court's statement that the practice
must be related to "legitimate employment goals." Prior to Wards Cove,
lower courts limited the nature of the business justification defense to
policies designed to further the goals of employee job performance or

business safety and efficiency. 152 The term "legitimate employment

goals" in Wards Cove may be an oblique signal that the business justification defense is limited to job performance criteria, or it may be meant to
open the door to a broad range of additional considerations.
149. Id. at 2125-26.
150. See, eg., Gillespie, 771 F.2d at 1040 ("significantly related to the applicant's ability to perform the job"); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1280 (9th Cir.
1981) ("significantly correlated"); Craig, 626 F.2d at 662 ("significantly job-related").
151. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) ("substantially")
with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) ("significantly") and Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) ("significantly"); see also M. Zimmer, C.
Sullivan & R. Richards, supra note 132, at 253 (asking whether "significant" is used in
the statistical sense, or, as a layperson might, as synonymous with "substantial").
152. One area of initial confusion was whether "business necessity" and "job relatedness" were synonymous or distinct concepts and which term should control the analysis.
Job relatedness tests whether an employment practice actually predicts an employee's
performance on the job. Business necessity tests whether criteria are necessary to the safe
and efficient operation of the business. Some commentators have suggested that job relatedness is a narrower defense because business necessity might justify use of disparately
impacting criteria that are unrelated to job performance. See M. Zimmer, C. Sullivan &
R. Richards, supra note 132, at 263. Others have suggested that Griggs requires that
neutral criteria be both job related and a business necessity. See Note, supranote 134, at
388-89. But see Contreras,656 F.2d at 1275-80 (criteria should be "significantly correlated" with important elements of the job).
While lower courts and the Supreme Court continue to use the terms "job-relatedness"
and "business necessity" interchangeably, in practice, most courts tend to apply the job
relatedness standard to scored employment tests, and business necessity analysis to nontesting, broad-based practices such as no beard policies, and height and weight requirements. Because it would be difficult to establish a correlation between an employee's job
and these more broadly based policies, courts focus instead on the overall needs of the
business and whether the policy promotes the safe and efficient operation of the business.
See Note, supra note 134, at 394-95, 401-03.
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pacting criteria could be justified only when forbidding them would seriously damage the business, that is, when they were "necessary" to the
operation of the business."4 Other lower courts rejected this strict approach and required a less exacting correlation of "manifest relationship." This standard requires that the criteria "substantially promote the
efficient operation of the business"' 4 5 or be "significantly related to the
applicant's ability to perform the job."' 14 6 The manifest relationship standard requires more than a mere "rational basis" for the challenged practice, but less than a perfect positive correlation. 4 7
In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the strict business necessity standard.' 4 8 It is unclear, though, whether the Court
meant to adopt the less stringent "manifest relationship" standard or
tried to articulate a new, even less demanding standard. As formulated
in Wards Cove, the nature of the defendant's business justification in88, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1016-17
(11th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 840-42 (10th
Cir. 1981); Kinsey v. First Regional See., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
These courts apply the standard first set forth by the Fourth Circuit in Robinson v.
LorillardCorp.:
[T]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for
adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding
legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must
effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must
be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better
accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a
lesser differential racial impact.

Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798 (footnotes omitted).
Under the Robinson formulation of strict business necessity, it is the defendant's burden to prove the absence of acceptable alternative practices. After Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), adopted a three-step approach for disparate impact cases,
lower courts split on which party has the burden of proof on less discriminatory alternatives. See Belton, supra note 105, at 1243-44.
144. In practice, the strict business necessity formulation establishes a balancing test:
the greater a policy's disparate impact on minorities, the greater the level of necessity
required to justify the practice. Where the disparate racial impact is slight, the employer's burden of justification is correspondingly lower. Generally, cost containment
and inconvenience are not sufficiently compellingjustifications, but serious economic consequences will overcome a prima facie case of disparate impact. For a discussion of the
strict business necessity standard as it has been applied by lower courts, see Brodin, supra
note 134, at 343; Note, supra note 134, at 390.
145. Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981).
146. Gillespie v. Wisconsin, 771 F.2d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1083 (1986).
147. See Craig v. County, 626 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919
(1981); see also Note, supranote 134, at 392-97 (discussing the manifest relationship standard as applied by lower courts).
148. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115,2126 (1989) ("IThere is
no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster.").
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IV. TITLE VI AND DISPROPORTIONATE ADVERSE IMPACT. THE
DEFENDANT'S BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION OUTSIDE THE

HEALTH CARE CONTEXT

Compared with the multitude of reported Title VII cases, Title VI
cases are few.' 56 Only four circuit court opinions directly address the
issue of the Title VI defendant's burden to justify a facially neutral policy
that has a disproportionate adverse impact. Two cases involve discrimination in federally funded health care while the other two cases involve
claims of discrimination in federally funded public schools.
While courts have tended to look to Title VII in developing evidentiary standards for claims involving disproportionate adverse impact
under other civil rights statutes, 5 7 in the Title VI context the courts have
split. All four Title VI cases look to Title VII standards defining the
disproportionate adverse impact defendant's burden of justification as
"instructive" in determining the Title VI defendant's burden. The health
care discrimination cases, though, reject the Title VII standards while
the education cases adopt their circuit's Title VII formulation of the defendant's burden ofjustification as the appropriate standard for Title VI.
The two Title VI cases outside the health care context involve policies
that disparately impact on minority children in public school systems. In
both cases the courts transplanted Title VII's evidentiary standards for
the defendant's justification into the Title VI context. In retrospect, the
cases illustrate how Wards Cove has sharply altered Title VII analysis by
removing any meaningful burden from the defendant.
In Larry P. v. Riles, 58 a class of Black school children challenged the
use of certain IQ tests by the California public school system to place
children in special classes for the educable mentally retarded (E.M.R.) as
a violation of Title VI.' 59 During the time period when the IQ tests were
used, Black children were significantly over-represented in the E.M.R.
classes. For example, in one year, Black children accounted for twentyseven percent of the E.M.R. populations, but comprised only nine percent of the state school population. The E.M.R. classes were "dead-end
classes" for children incapable of learning in regular classes. The E.M.R.
156. Title VI health care issues have generally been addressed in the administrative

arena. For a discussion critical of the federal agencies' administrative enforcement of
Title VI, see Wing, supra note 13, at 161-75.

157. Courts have applied Title VII prima facie case analysis, including the defendant's
burden of justification, to housing discrimination claims under Title VIII, and age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967. See supra

note 56.
158. 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
159. See id. at 972. Plaintiffs also included claims that the use of the IQ tests violated
the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 and 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (repealed
1982); the Education For All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982);
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); the equal protec-

tion clauses of the United States and California Constitutions; and several sections of the
California Education Code. See Larry P., 793 F.2d at 972.

1990]

REINVIGORATING TITLE VT

In either case, a showing that an employment practice is significantly
related to legitimate employment goals is still a higher showing than that
required of a defendant in a disparate treatment case who needs only to
show any legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment practice.' 5 3 The requirement of any correlation between the facially neutral
practice and the employer's legitimate employment goals distinguishes
the disparate impact defendant's burden from that of a defendant
charged with intentional discrimination and creates at least a slightly
more demanding nature
for the disproportionate adverse impact defend54
ant's justification.1
Finally, the Wards Cove Court carved out only a very narrow role for
the less discriminatory alternatives analysis in the third stage of disproportionate adverse impact analysis. The Court warned that the proffered
alternative must be equally effective, and that factors such as increased
cost are relevant in making the determination of equal effectiveness. The
Court urged lower courts to "proceed with care" in their consideration of
less discriminatory alternatives. 55
Because the Wards Cove majority stated its formulation in the abstract
and did not apply it to any facts, the exact nature of the defendant's
business justification in a Title VII case remains uncertain. What is certain, though, is that Wards Cove has drastically reduced the burden on an
employer to defend against a claim that an employment policy disproportionately adversely impacts on a protected group. Employers now have
quite an easy burden of justification. Wards Cove so blurs the distinctions between adverse disproportionate impact and inferential disparate
treatment that the burden placed on a disproportionate adverse impact
defendant may now be indistinguishable from that placed on a disparate
treatment defendant. If there is any difference in the respective burdens,
it is that a disparate treatment defendant may justify a practice by introducing evidence of any legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, while a
disproportionate adverse impact defendant has the weightier burden of
showing a significant correlation between the challenged practice and a
legitimate employment goal.
153. See, e.g., Furnish, A Path Through the Maze DisparateImpact and Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23
B.C.L. Rev. 419, 421-25 (1982); Rutherglen, DisparateImpact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination,73 Va. L. Rev. 1297, 1312 (1987).

154. But see Blumoff & Lewis, The Reagan Court and Title VII. A Common Law
Outlook on a Statutory Task (to be published at 69 N.C.L. Rev. - (Nov. 1990)) (manuscript on file at FordhamLaw Review). The authors conclude that after Wards Cove the
nature of the defendant's burden of justification in an adverse disproportionate impact
case is indistinguishable from that in an inferential disparate treatment case.
155. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2127 (1989).
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classes did not result in skills that would enable the students to return to
the regular classroom; they merely focused on the tasks of social
adjustment. 60
Upon finding that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie showing of
disparate impact on Black students, the court of appeals, without discussion, relied on Ninth Circuit Title VII disproportionate adverse impact
precedent to define the defendant's burden of justification. 161 The court
held that the defendant had the burden of proof to establish that the tests
were "manifestly related" to the E.M.R. classes.16 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding that the defendant had failed to persuade that the IQ tests validly and accurately predicted mental retardation among Blacks. 163
In the second case, GeorgiaState Conference of Branchesof NAACP v.
Georgia,1" a class of Black school children alleged that certain Georgia
public school systems had violated Title VI through their practice of
grouping students in classes on the basis of ability and achievement.1 65
The court found that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case that
achievement
grouping had a disproportionate adverse effect on Black
1 66

children.

The Eleventh Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, used its prior Title VII
167
cases to establish the evidentiary burdens in a Title VI impact case.
The court affirmed the district court's finding that the defendants had
carried their burden of proof to show that the tests used to assign students to achievement groups validly tested the students in the subject
grouped, closely related subjects or in a broad variety of subjects.1 68 It
found that the achievement grouping was manifestly related to educational needs because it improved class manageability and permitted more
resources to be directed to slower students.1 69 Although there was conflicting evidence, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that the
plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proof that intraclass grouping was 17an equally sound educational alternative to achievement
grouping. 0
After Wards Cove, though, to the extent that courts follow Title VII
160. See Larry P., 793 F.2d at 973.
161. See id. at 982.
162. See id. at 982 & nn.9 & 10.
163. See id. at 983.
164. 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985).
165. See id. at 1408. The plaintiffs also alleged that these practices violated the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1408.
166. See Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 1420.
169. See id. at 1419.
170. See id. at 1421. Plaintiffs argued that random assignment accompanied by intraclass grouping was a less discriminatory alternative. See id. at 1421-22.
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precedent in Title VI cases, the defendant's burden ofjustification is now
much lighter than that articulated in Larry P. and NAACP. The defendant no longer bears the risk of non-persuasion on its justification, but
merely needs to introduce some evidence that its practice is significantly
related to some educational need. Although the Larry P. plaintiffs prevailed under pre-Wards Cove Title VII standards, the outcome would
most likely be different after Wards Cove because the burden of proof
now lies with the plaintiff and the lower courts have been warned to be
wary when considering less discriminatory alternatives.
V. THE TITLE VI HEALTH CARE CASES
The Title VI health care cases involve situations that are significantly
different from the facts normally analyzed under Title VII. Bryan v.
Koch 7 concerns a decision to close a public hospital, while NAACP v.
Medical Center,Inc.172 involves a decision to relocate a non-profit hospital. Rather than applying Title VII standards, Bryan holds and Medical
Center implies that in the Title VI health care context a policy with a
disparate impact can be justified by showing merely that the policy is
rationally related to a legitimate need. 17 - This test is even less rigorous
than the Wards Cove Title VII standard requiring that a disparately impacting policy significantly further a legitimate employment goal.
Bryan v. Koch arose when the City of New York decided to close
Sydenham Hospital, one of the city's seventeen public hospitals. 174 Minority patients filed a Title VI action alleging that the closing of
Sydenham had a disparate impact on Blacks and Hispnics. 175 While
171. 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).

172. 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
173. In neither case did the plaintiffs argue that the court should apply Title VII standards in the context of discrimination in federally funded health care. The plaintiffs proposed an alternative standard that would require the defendant to prove that a
disparately impacting criteria was necessary to achieve legitimate objectives, and that
these objectives could not be achieved through less discriminatory means.
Bryan and Medical Center were decided after Bakke but before Guardians,and in both
cases the initial issue was whether Title VI proscribed disparate impact discrimination.
Medical Center held that Title VI proscribes unintentional disparate impact discrimination. See Medical Center, 657 F.2d at 1328. Bryan expressed no view on the issue, but
concluded that even if Title VI proscribed disparate impact discrimination, plaintiffs had
failed to establish their claim. See Bryan, 627 F.2d at 616.
174. See Bryan, 627 F.2d at 614. A Health Policy Task Force appointed by Mayor
Koch recommended that the City could save $30 million by, among other moves, reducing excess beds in its municipal hospital system. See id. Among other recommendations,
the Task Force suggested that Sydenham Hospital be closed. See id.
175. Sydenham was located in central Harlem, and its patients were 98 percent Black
and Hispanic while the minority proportion of patients served by the entire City municipal hospital system was only 66 percent. Even though there were six hospitals within 30
minutes of Sydenham, there was some question as to whether the nearby hospitals would
be able and willing to admit all of Sydenham's indigent and Medicaid patients. In addition, there were a small number of emergency room patients who would be at risk if they
had to travel even slightly farther than Sydenham to reach an emergency room. See id. at
617.
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some of the panel thought the issue a close one, the court unanimously
held that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate
impact. 176

In evaluating the defendant's proffered justification, the Second Circuit
eschewed use of Title VII analysis, noting that analogies to other civil
rights statutes were limited. The court inquired instead whether the decision to177close Sydenham was rationally related to a legitimate
objective.
New York City's proffered justification for closing Sydenham was that
the closure would reduce total hospital expenditures and would increase
efficiency within the municipal hospital system. 178 The court assumed,
without analysis, that the city's goal of saving money and increasing efficiency was "obviously" a legitimate objective. The court then asked two
questions: whether the criteria used to decide which hospital to close
were reasonably related to reducing expenditures and increasing efficiency and whether the decision to close Sydenham was justified according to these criteria. Not surprisingly, since the plaintiffs had never
contested that Syderhiam was the appropriate hospital to close if one
public hospital was to be closed, the court found that the city's decision
79
to close Sydenham withstood this rational relationship scrutiny.1
Further, the court refused to consider plaintiff's proffered less discriminatory alternatives. Plaintiffs argued that the city could save just as
much money and increase hospital efficiency with less impact on minorities by regionalizing hospital services, merging hospitals or increasing
Sydenham's services to make it more profitable to operate rather than
closing Sydenham or any public hospital. The court feared that an alternatives inquiry that went beyond the question of which hospital to close
would impinge upon elected officials' discretion to run their city
government.18 0
The second Title VI health care decision to address the defendant's
burden of justification arose in the context of a hospital site controversy.
NAACP v. Medical Center,Inc.18 1 involved a proposed hospital reorganization and relocation from the predominately Black inner city of Wilmington, Delaware, to a predominately white suburb.18 2 Plaintiffs
176. See id. at 616.
177. See id. at 618-20. The plaintiffs argued that the court should evaluate the city's
justification under a standard requiring the city to show that the closing of Sydenham was
"'necessary to achieve legitimate objectives. . . and that these objectives cannot be
achieved by other measures having a less disproportionate adverse effect."' Id. at 618

(quoting Letter from the Undersecretary of HEW to Mayor Edward Koch (Mar. 5,
1980)).
178. See id. at 617.
179. See id. at 616-18. The court did not address the issue of which party bears the
burden of proof on the issue of the defendant's justification.
180. See id. at 619.
181. 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
182. See id. at 1324. The Medical Center proposed to close two of three inner city
hospitals reducing inner-city hospital beds from 1,104 to 250. The remaining inner-city
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alleged that the relocation plan violated Title VI because the Medical
Center's remaining urban facility would become a "ghetto hospital" serving primarily minorities, the poor, elderly, and handicapped, while the
proposed suburban hospital would treat only the more affluent white
population." 3 The plaintiffs also alleged that the relocation of certain
acute care services exclusively to the new suburban hospital would make
them virtually
inaccessible to many handicapped and minority
184
residents.

The Third Circuit, sitting en bane, assumed that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact185 but affirmed the district court's finding that the defendant had met its burden of justification.
The court treated its analysis of Title VII as dispositive, holding that the
Title VI plaintiff bears the risk of non-persuasion on the defendant's justification in a Title VI case."8 6
In contrast, the court did not treat Title VII as conclusive or even
instructive in determining the nature of the defendant's justification.8 7
A majority affirmed the district court's determination that the defendant
had met its burden of justification. The district court had required that
the relocation serve a legitimate bona fide interest and that there be no
less discriminatory alternative. 88 In affirming, a plurality characterized
hospital would be renovated, and the Medical Center would open a new 780 bed hospital
in a suburb 9.35 miles from downtown Wilmington. The plan called for removing most
special pediatric, obstetric, tertiary care, and sophisticated services from downtown Wilmington, but retained inner-city emergency room services. See id. at 1325.
183. See id. at 1324.
184. See id. at 1326. Plaintiffs' claims relating to discrimination against the handicapped were litigated under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined
in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Medical Center, 657 F.2d at 1331 n.9 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 111978)).
Plaintiffs' claims of age discrimination were brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1982). Section 303 provides:
Pursuant to regulations described under section 6103 of this title, and except as
provided by section 6103(b) and section 6103(c) of this title, no person in the
United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Medical Center, 657 F.2d at 1331 n.9 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1976)).
185. See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1332 (3d Cir. 1981). Like
Bryan, Medical Center was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Guardians,
and part of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of the court's reasons for concluding
that Title VI prohibits disparate impact discrimination. See id. at 1328-3 1.
186. See id. at 1336. The Third Circuit engaged in a detailed analysis of Title VII
cases and became the only circuit, prior to Wards Cove, to place the risk of non-persuasion on the issue of the defendant's justification on the Title VII defendant. See id. at
1334-38.
187. See id. at 1336-37.
188. The district court's standard required the defendant to show that the plan would
"'in theory and practice" serve 'a legitimate bona fide interest of [the Medical Center]

REINVIGORA TING TITLE VI
the district court's standard as more stringent than a rational relationship test and "more than adequately served Title VI aims," 1 9 while suggesting that the appropriate standard for judging a Title VI defendant's
justification was a rational relationship test required by the
Constitution. 9 0

The rational relationship test articulated in Bryan and Medical Center
is so undemanding that a decision to use the standard is tantamount to
holding that the challenged policy is valid. 191 Rational relationship scrutiny merely inquires whether there is any relationship between the challenged practice and any legitimate goal.' 92 It strikes down only
classifications
that are arbitrary because they fail to advance any legiti193
mate goal.
Rational relationship is even less demanding than the watered down
.... and [the Medical Center] must show that no alternative course of action could be
adopted that would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact."'
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 315-16 (D. Del. 1980)
(quoting Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.denied,
435 U.S. 908 (1978)), aff'd 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981). The district court declined to
try to fashion ajustification standard for all Title VI cases. For this case the district court
rejected the use of Title VII's "business necessity" standard and instead used the Title
VIII standard articulated by the Third Circuit for housing discrimination cases involving
public defendants: there must be a legitimate bona fide interest and lack of less discriminatory alternatives. The district court found that because the Medical Center case involved a challenge to the site location of a hospital, it was more similar to a housing
location decision under Title VIII than to employment decisions covered by Title VIL
See id. at 315.
189. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1337 (3d Cir. 1981) (footnote
omitted). Two judges would have adopted the district court's standard. See id. at 1337
n.18.
190. See id. at 1336. In suggesting a rational relationship test, the plurality relied on
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). Jefferson was primarily a constitutional challenge to a facially neutral statute that had a disproportionate adverse impact on minorities. See id. at 537-38. Texas' welfare statute paid AFDC families, who were
predominately Black and Mexican-American, a reduced percentage of their need while
paying disabled and retired welfare recipients, who were primarily white, 100 percent of
their need standard. See id. at 545. A bare majority of the Court held the facially neutral
Texas statute was not unconstitutional because it was rationally related to the purposes of
the separate welfare programs. See id. at 548. After deciding the constitutional issue, the
majority, without analysis or discussion, implied in a footnote that a similar analysis
would be appropriate under both Title VI and Title VII. See id. at 550 n.19.
The Court's ill-considered footnote in Jefferson does not support the use of a rational
relationship standard in Title VI cases. Jefferson was decided the same term as Griggs,
and the parameters of the defendant's justification under Title VII had not yet developed.
Nor had the Supreme Court articulated the difference between the reach of the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII in Washington v. Davis. See supra text accompanying
notes 61-63.
191. See, ag., Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972) (rational relationship test provides "minimal scrutiny in theory and
virtually none in fact").
192. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
193. See Bice, Standardsof JudicialReview Under the EqualProtection andDue Process Clauses, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 689, 698 (1977).
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Title VII standard. After Wards Cove, Title VII disproportionate adverse impact analysis still requires a "significant" correlation between the
challenged practice and a legitimate employment goal. 19 4 Rational relationship scrutiny does not require any degree of correlation; it asks
merely if there is any relationship.' 95
Title VII analysis after Wards Cove also requires that the challenged
policy further a "legitimate employment goal." This language may open
the door to a broader range of legitimate concerns than the ones recognized prior to Wards Cove when disparately impacting employment criteria could be justified only if they were related to job skills, job safety or
job efficiency.' 9 6 However, Wards Cove's "legitimate employment goal"
still appears to be narrower than rational relationship's mere requirement
of "any legitimate reason."
In particular, prior to Wards Cove courts rejected cost savings as a
legitimate consideration for Title VII purposes.' 97 Even after Wards
Cove mere cost containment and inconvenience still arguably do not satisfy the requirement of a "legitimate employment goal." In contrast, the
court in Bryan accepted an interest in saving money, without discussion
or comment, as a legitimate reason that would satisfy its rational relationship test.198
Title VII analysis also considers less discriminatory alternatives.
While Wards Cove reduces the importance of the less discriminatory alternatives analysis in Title VII by requiring that the alternatives be
"equally effective," it remains an element of the analysis.' 99 On the other
hand, under rational relationship scrutiny the existence of less discriminatory alternatives is totally irrelevant.
More fundamentally, any disproportionate adverse impact standard,
whether under Title VI, Title VII or any other statute, should require a
heavier burden of justification than mere rational relationship. In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not
prohibit policies and practices with a disproportionate adverse racial. impact, but requires merely that such policies, like all governmental classifications, be justified as at least bearing a rational relationship to some
legitimate governmental goal." ° The Title VI regulations forbidding
194. See supra text accompanying notes 148-151.
195. See, eg., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 448-53 (1961) (state action to be
upheld if any state of facts reasonably conceivable may justify it).
196. See supra text accompanying note 153.
197. Cost containment and inconvenience are not sufficiently compelling justifications
for Title VII, but serious economic consequences will overcome a prima facie case of
disproportionate adverse impact. See Brodine, supra note 134, at 343; Note, supra note
134, at 387-91.

198. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 1980).
199. See supra text accompanying note 155.

200. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires strict scrutiny analysis

only when it can be shown that a facially neutral classification has been enacted with the
purpose and intent of discriminating against a minority group. While disproportionate
adverse impact may be evidence of discriminatory motive, such impact alone is not
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facially neutral policies that impact disproportionately on minorities
reach beyond this constitutional prohibition to forbid facially neutral
policies that can be justified under a rational relationship test. By definition, a prohibition on disproportionate adverse impact discrimination requires a more stringent justification than the mere rational relationship
required by the Constitution.
VI.

UNHITCHING TITLE VI FROM

TITLE VII

The fundamental problem with lower courts' analysis of the evidentiary burdens in Title VI disproportionate adverse impact cases is that
they have used Title VII principles as the starting point for their analysis.
Title VII does not provide the answers for Title VI. Although Title V
and Title VII are both anti-discrimination statutes and both were enacted
as part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the similarities end there. Title V
and Title VII serve different purposes and seek to effectuate different
goals. There are crucial structural and philosophical differences between
the two statutes and the activities they regulate. These differences destroy any attempted analogy between Title VI and Title VII, and argue,
instead, for an independent Title VI doctrine defining the defendant's
burden of justification in a disproportionate adverse impact case.
As the Supreme Court has said, "Title VII and Title V... cannot be
read in par! materia."'°0 Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress'
power under the commerce clause to regulate purely private decisionmaking.2 0 Title VII reaches into private employment relationships, financed with private money, and mandates that employers structure their
hiring decisions and business practices to accommodate a societal decision that all people, regardless of race or sex, should have an equal opportunity at employment.
In enacting Title VII, Congress overrode a strong common-law tradition of employment-at-will which allows a private employer to hire and
fire whomever he wishes. 20 3 Even in the midst of forging a majority to
pass Title VII, many members of Congress remained reluctant to impose
federal regulation on private business. Thus, Title VII incorporates a
number of provisions, not found in Title VI, designed to ensure that Title
enough to trigger strict scrutiny. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
Only those facially neutral classifications that have been enacted with the specific intent
to discriminate must be justified under a strict scrutiny standard which requires proof of a
substantial relationship between the challenged practice and a compelling state interest,
as well as the absence of a less discriminatory alternative. See Perry, Modern Equal
Protection: .4Conceptualizationand,4ppraisal,79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1033-36 (1979)
(standard of review in modem Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence).
201. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979); see Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1450 n.6 (1987) (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 206
n.6).
202. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 206 n.6; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 367 (1978).
203. Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 154.
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VII's nondiscrimination mandate does not lead to undue "Federal Government interference with private businesses." 2
In (riggs the Court held that Title VII prohibits facially neutral practices that have a disproportionate adverse impact on protected groups,
but the historical hesitancy to interfere with private employment decisions continues to stalk disproportionate adverse impact analysis under
Title VII. Some commentators continue to challenge the underlying theory of disproportionate adverse impact as inconsistent with the goals and
purposes of Title VII. Other critics of the theory or its application argue
that as employment decisions create ongoing relationships, the courts
should be cautious in second-guessing employers' judgments. Still others
argue that the economics of the marketplace are better able to correct
discrimination than the mandates of Title VII and that protected groups
are better served if employers are allowed to run their businesses free2 0of5
interference from Title VII disproportionate impact scrutiny.
Although the Court has not responded directly to these arguments, it has
heard them. The Court has become increasingly reluctant to secondguess employment decisions that disparately impact upon protected
groups. The Court's most recent decision in Wards Cove allows disparately impacting practices to withstand Title VII scrutiny as long as the
employer can articulate any legitimate employment goal that the practice
significantly furthers. Very few, if any, disparately impacting employment criteria will be struck down under the Wards Cove standard. In the
Title VII context, the employer now has great discretion to use disparately impacting criteria.
The criticisms that have been argued to dilute the defendant's evidentiary.burden in Title VII disproportionate adverse impact analysis do not
apply to Title VI. While Title VII marked a break with the common-law
tradition of government non-involvement in private employment, Title
VI arises from the long-standing and often used spending power of Congress to condition the terms of government spending.2"6 Title VI involves the exercise of federal power over a matter in which the federal
government is already directly involved: programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance.
204. 110 Cong. Rec. 14314 (1964) (remarks of Senator Miller) (quoted in Weber, 443
U.S. at 206). For example, Title VII contains statutory exceptions for professionally developed tests, bona fide seniority systems, and bona fide merit systems that do not appear
in Title VI. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1982); id. §§ 2000d-2000d-4.
205. For criticisms of Title VII disparate impact liability, including the defendant's
burden of justification, see Winborn, The DisparateImpact Model of Discrimination:
Theory and Limits, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 799, 802-03 (1985); Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-ImpactLiability Under Title VII, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 911, 912

(1979).
206. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983); see also
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284-87 (1978) (Title VI enacted to
prevent recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on protected class); Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-69 (1974) (conditioning funds on schools' contractual agreement to comply with Title VI).

REINVIGORATING TITLE V
Title VI, unlike Title VII, does not reach out and regulate purely private employment. Title VI is concerned that the "intended beneficiaries"
of federal money have equal access to federally funded programs.2 7 Title VI recipients, unlike Title VII employers, voluntarily seek federal
money. In return for this money they agree to comply with the Title VI
statute and regulations prohibiting facially neutral practices with a disproportionate adverse impact. While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to scrutinize strictly private employment relationships under Title
VII, it should demand precise compliance with spending power

legislation.
The federal government has made a significant financial commitment
to health care. Health care spending is one of the largest components of
the federal budget, accounting for 127 billion federal dollars and nearly
twelve percent of total federal expenditures in 1986.208 Federal money,
primarily Medicaid and Medicare, pays for approximately thirty percent
of the total costs of health care in the United States.2 9 The federal government's role is greatest in the hospital sector, where federal dollars pay
for forty-three percent of the care provided, but federal money also pays
for twenty-four percent
of doctors' fees and twenty-seven percent of
210

nursing home costs.

Yet minority Americans still are in worse health and receive less
health care than white Americans. Although Blacks are generally in

worse health than whites, 211 they receive fewer services from doctors and

207. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1988). Title VI applies to employment, but only when
employment is the "primary purpose of the funding," thus the employee is the "intended
beneficiary."
208. See Reuter, FederalHealth Policy Overview, 8 Cong. Res. Serv. Rev. 9:1 (1987).
209. See id. at 2. In 1986 Medicare and Medicaid alone accounted for nearly 80 percent of all federal health spending.
210. See Koitz, FederalRolein Health Financing,8 Cong. Res. Rev. 9:6 (1987). These
figures are for fiscal year 1985.
211. The life expectancy of Black males is almost seven years less than for white males;
for Black females it is approximately five years less than for white females. See R. W.
Johnson, Special Report, The Foundation's Minority Medical Training Programs, Vol. 1,
5 (1987). If Blacks had the same death rates as whites, 59,000 Black deaths a year would
not occur. See Savage, McGee & Oster, Reduction ofHypertension-AssociatedHeartDisease and Stroke Among Black Americans: Past Experience and New Perspectives on
Targeting Resources, 65 Milbank Q. 297, 306 (1987) (Supp. 2).
Blacks have higher death rates resulting from all three of the major killers-heart disease, cancer, and stroke. See Andersen, Chen, Aday & Cornelius, Health Status and
Medical Care Utilization, Health Affairs 136, 149 (1987). Black infant mortality continues to be nearly twice that of whites. See R. W. Johnson, supra, at 5. This difference is
not completely attributable to more young black mothers, but is due in part to inadequate
prenatal care and family planning. See id.; Miller, supra note 14, at 505-06.
Blacks have more undetected disease than whites, and Black children may be in worse
health than white children. See id. at 506. Older Blacks suffer from more functional
limitations than older whites, a situation of "rapid" and "disproportionate" aging. See
Gibson & Jackson, The Health,PhysicalFunctioning,and InformalSupports of the Black
Elderly, 65 Milbank Q. 421, 446 (1987) (Supp. 2).
In a survey conducted in 1986, 15.3% of Blacks and 19.4 percent of Hispanics reported
their health as fair to poor as compared with only 10.6 percent of whites. See Freeman,
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hospitals. Blacks have one-third fewer visits to doctors than do whites
with comparable health status.2 12 There is a thirty-four percent difference between the percentage of Hispanics admitted for hospital inpatient
care and the percentage of whites; the gap between Blacks and whites is
nine percent.2 13 Blacks and Hispanics are less likely than whites to have
private physicians, 2 1 4 while a disproportionate number of Blacks rely on
hospital emergency rooms and outpatient clinics for primary care.215
There still exist vestiges of a dual system of hospitals and nursing
homes: one system for whites and a separate system for minorities.
Although the data is scarce, in areas that have been studied most hospitals and nursing homes are not racially integrated and treat patients
predominantly of one racial group. For example, of twenty-four hospitals and twenty nursing homes studied in Atlanta and Birmingham, five
facilities served sixty-seven percent of the Black patients, while one hospital and six nursing homes had no Black patients. A single nursing
home in21 Atlanta
served seventy-five percent of the Black Medicare
6
patients.

If minorities are ever to gain full access to America's health care system, judges must stringently scrutinize facially neutral policies that
exclude a disproportionate number of minority patients. Title VI's imBlendon, Aiken, Sudman, Mullinix & Corey,Americans Report on TheirAccess to Health
Care, 6 Health Affairs 6, 12 (1987) [hereinafter Access to Health Care]. "[S]tudies have
shown that a person's self-assessment of health status is a reasonably sensitive indicator
of actual need for medical care, including the presence of chronic conditions and disabilities, the number of specific health problems and symptoms, sensory impairment and immobility, and limitations of normal activities due to illness." Id. at 9.
212. See Access to Health Care, supra note 211, at 12-18. In 1986, whites in fair to
poor health averaged 10.1 doctor visits, whereas the average number of visits for Blacks
was only 6.8, and 9.8 for Hispanics. See id. at 12. In 1986, one quarter of all Blacks with
a chronic illness did not see a physician even once in the preceding year. See id. at 14.
These differences in rate of physician usage cannot be attributed to differences in ability
to pay because when middle class whites and Blacks are compared, Blacks still use doctors significantly less than whites. See Diehr, Martin, Price, Friedlander, Richardson &
Riedel, Use of Ambulatory Care Services in Three ProviderPlans: Interaction Between
PatientCharacteristicsand Plans, 74 Am. I. Public Health 47, 47, 49 (1984) (race was
found to be significantly correlated to use in three health care plans studied; Black use
was ten percentage points less in an independent practice association ("IPA"), fourteen in
a Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"), and twenty in a Blue Cross plan.)
213. See Access to Health Care, supra note 211, at 12-13. These percentages still underestimate the discrepancy between white and minority hospital care because they do
not take into account that 15.3 percent of Blacks and 19.4 percent of Hispanics surveyed
were in fair to poor health as to compared to only 10.6 percent of whites. See id.
214. Minorities are less likely to see private physicians regardless of income level or
type of insurance. Minorities are also less likely than whites to see specialists. See Health
Care in Context, supra note 1, at 38-39; see also Common Destiny, supra note 14, at 431;
and Secretary's Task Force,supra note 15, at 189.
215. See Davis, Lillie-Blanton, Lyons, Mullan, Powe & Rowland, Health Care for
Black Americans: The PublicSector Role, 65 Milbank Q. 213, 214 (1987) (Supp. 1). In
1983, 27 percent of Blacks, but only 13 percent of whites, reported a hospital outpatient
department or emergency room as their usual source of care. See Common Destiny, supra
note 14, at 431.
216. See Wing, supra note 13, at 177-78.

1990]

REINVIGORATING TITLE VI

plementing regulations specifically prohibit facially neutral policies that
have the effect of discriminating against minorities, and courts should
strictly construe the regulations. Federally funded hospitals must bear a
heavy burden to justify such policies and to show that there are no less
discriminatory alternatives available. Business as usual is not delivering
health care to minority Americans.
VII. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR TITLE VI HOSPITAL CASES
The standards for a Title VI health care defendant should involve a
probing judicial review of and little deference to facially neutral policies
with a disparate racial impact. The purpose of Title VI is to ensure that
the intended beneficiaries of federally funded programs have equal opportunity to enjoy program benefits.217 Disproportionate exclusion of
minorities should not be tolerated under Title VI unless it is unavoidable.
The burden ofjustification for Title VI hospitals and other health care
providers should be to prove that the challenged practice significantly
furthers an important, legitimate program objective which cannot be sub-

stantially accomplished through less discriminatory means.2"' The proposed Title VI standard requires the defendant to justify the "necessity"
for facially neutral criteria by carrying the risk of non-persuasion on two
issues: Does the policy significantly further an important, legitimate program objective? Can that objective be accomplished through less dis-

criminatory means?
First, a facially neutral policy challenged under Title VI should further
217. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1, 80.3(b)(2) (1989).
218. The Department of Health and Human Services ('HHI-S") has interpreted its "effect" regulation as incorporating this standard ofjustification for private litigation under
Title VI. In Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (1980), the Department argued that the defendant had to prove that the challenged practice was "'necessary to achieve legitimate
objectives unrelated to race or national origin and that these objectives cannot be
achieved by other measures having a less disproportionate adverse effect.'" Id. at 618
(quoting Letter from the Undersecretary of HEW to Mayor Edward Koch (Mar. 5,
1980)). In Medical Center HEW's position was that the hospital relocation had to be
justified by "'important non-race related goals'... 'related to the delivery of quality,
accessible, and integrated health care'" and that no alternative arrangements exist that
substantially accomplish these goals. See Note, MaintainingHealth Care in the Inner
City: Title VI and Hospital Relocations, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 271, 294 (1980) (quoting
Letter of Findings Concerning Wilmington Medical Center's Plan Omega, from Dewey
Dodd, Director of Office of Civil Rights, Region III, HEW, to James A. Harding, President, Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. at 13 (July 5, 1977)).
While Supreme Court case law is inconsistent, the Court often gives controlling weight
to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, stating that
the agency's construction will be upheld unless it is "plainly erroneous," "unreasonable,"
or "inconsistently applied." See Weaver, JudicialInterpretationofAdministrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 587, 590-93 (1984). Under this standard,
the Court gives much greater deference to the agency's construction of its own regulation
than it does to the agency's construction of a statute. See id. at 604-05. An agency's
interpretation of its own regulation does not need to be persuasive in order to mandate a
court's deference, while deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute depends substantially on the persuasiveness of the agency's view. See id. at 605.
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an important legitimate program objective. Title VII disparate treatment
claims can be defended through a showing of any legitimate non-discriminatory objective,2 1 9 while post-Wards Cove Title VII disproportionate
adverse impact cases can be defended by a showing of a "legitimate employment goal."' 0 Title VI disproportionate adverse impact claims require not just any legitimate objective but one that is important to the
operation of the program. Maintaining a high quality medical program,
patient and staff safety, and financial necessity should all qualify as important objectives in the health care context. On the other hand, a mere
interest in cutting costs or saving money is not a sufficiently important
concern, without some element of financial necessity, to qualify as an
important interest. Such cost concerns have been rejected under Title
VII analysis,2 2 1 and Title VI scrutiny should be even more demanding.
Second, the challenged policy should "significantly" further its important purpose. A federally funded health care defendant should do more
than merely assert that the policy furthers an important purpose; it
should introduce some empirical evidence establishing the challenged
practice is, in fact, effective in furthering an important program need.
The greater the disproportionate adverse impact the more effective the
challenged practice needs to be to justify its continued use. For example,
if a policy excluded almost all minority patients while only incrementally
improving the quality of patient care, the policy would not "significantly" further the important, legitimate objective of non-discriminatory,
high-quality care. In effect, the requirement of a "significant" relationship creates a balancing test.
However, the crux of the proposed Title VI standard is the inquiry
into less discriminatory alternatives. Rather than inquiring directly into
the strength of the relationship between the policy chosen and the goal
sought, evidence of less discriminatory alternatives provides a framework
for evaluating a health care provider's need for a facially neutral practice
that disparately impacts on minorities. The existence of workable alternatives serves as proof that the challenged policy is insufficiently related
to the hospital's asserted goal or that the hospital's interests advanced by
a particular policy are not important enough to justify use of the policy
in light of its disparate racial impact. 2 22 This Title VI focus on alternatives is designed to avoid the confusion engendered by Title VII terms
such as "significant," "substantial," "manifest" and "essential."
The range of available less discriminatory alternatives in Title VI
health care cases should be much broader than it is in post-Wards Cove
219. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
220. See supra text accompanying note 152.
221. See, eg., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir.
1970), cert.denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490,
495 (C.D. Cal. 1971). For a discussion of lower courts' rejection of a cost defense in Title
VII cases and the Supreme Court's increasing willingness to consider costs in Title VII
cases, see Brodine, supra note 134, at 337-53.
222. See Lamber, supra note 133, at 16-17.
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Title VII cases. Wards Cove requires that a proffered alternative be
equally effective and warns that costs and other burdens are to be considered in determining equality2 3 Under the proposed Title VI standard,
the plaintiff prevails if the less discriminatory alternative substantially
accomplishes the health care provider's important legitimate objectives.
The costs do not need to be identical. A more costly less discriminatory
alternative is acceptable as long as the cost differential is not too substantial.224 The defendant carries the burden of persuasion to prove that the
alternatives are not workable, are not feasible or do not further the employer's important, legitimate business goal."2 Title VI defendants accept federal money, and in return they accept greater scrutiny of their
program practices and organization.
The Title VI health care defendant should bear the risk of non-persuasion on both the important, legitimate business objective and the less discriminatory alternatives. Placing the burden of persuasion on the
defendant does not mean that the hospital must disprove every conceivable alternative. The plaintiff has an initial burden to identify reasonable
alternatives. The health care provider then must respond and meet the
ultimate burden of persuasion by demonstrating that the plaintiff's suggested alternatives do not substantially accomplish the important program objectives.
While the defendant's burden is substantial, it is not impossible. The
defendant is the appropriate party to carry the burden of persuasion because it is the health care provider who has specific knowledge of the
practices it uses, the rationale supporting their use, and the effects these
practices have on patients, doctors and hospital staff.2 6 Although the
plaintiff may be able to identify some of this information through discovery, it is expensive and inefficient to place the burden of persuasion on
the plaintiff when the defendant has access to this information and intimate knowledge of its relevance.
223. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126-27 (1989).
224. See Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A
No-Alternative Approach, 84 Yale L.J. 98, 115 (1974) (quoting Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). The
author proposes a "not insubstantial" test for Title VII:
The phrase "not insubstantial" refers to a difference in costs which is not trivial
or de minimis. This standard is a relative one and includes consideration of the
economic situation of the specific employer. For example, a cost differential
may be truly insubstantial for a large business with many employees but not for
a smaller employer with fewer workers.
Id. at 115 n.72.
225. See, eg., Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1290 n.4 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1987) (Tang, J., dissenting) (Title VII case); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 270 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (Title VII case).
226. See, ag., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Title VII case;
placing burden of proving business necessity on defendant is traditionally justified because employers have superior access to employment information).
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CONCLUSION

In the twenty-five years since passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
the enactment of the Medicaid and Medicare programs, Americans'
health has improved dramatically. Nevertheless, minorities stiff do not
get the health care services they need nor are they fully integrated into
the mainstream of American health care. Longstanding hospital policies,
such as private physician rules and pre-admission deposits, still operate
to exclude minority patients from federally funded health care.
Courts have mistakenly turned to Title VII principles as the starting
point for fashioning evidentiary burdens in Title VI cases involving challenges to facially neutral policies that have the effect of excluding minority patients. Title VII regulates purely private employment decisions,
and the Supreme Court has been increasingly reluctant to scrutinize private employers' use of employment practices that impact disproportionately upon protected groups.
Courts should not be reluctant to scrutinize the operation of federally
funded programs. Title VI is a spending power statute. It does not regulate but places conditions on the expenditure of federal money. As a
condition of receipt of federal Medicaid and Medicare money, hospitals
and other health care providers guarantee that they will not use policies
and practices that have the effect of excluding minority patients. Courts
should hold health care providers to their promise.
In the health care context a Title VI defendant should have to prove
that a facially neutral policy that has a disproportionate adverse impact
on minorities significantly furthers an important program objective that
cannot be achieved through less discriminatory means. This standard
focuses on less discriminatory alternatives. The old alternatives have excluded minorities. A search for less discriminatory alternatives will encourage the development of new approaches to health care
administration.

